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NOTE
NEVER SAY NEVER: "NEVER EVENTS"
IN MEDICARE
John Cristt
INTRODUCTION
In 2004, James Klotz suffered a heart attack. After he was admit-
ted to the hospital, surgeons surgically implanted a pacemaker in
him.' While he recovered from surgery in the hospital, Klotz devel-
oped a drug-resistant staph infection that required fifteen additional
operations and eighty-four additional days in the hospital.2 Klotz sub-
sequently "lost his right leg, part of his left foot, a kidney, and most of
his hearing."3 Klotz sued his heart surgeon for medical malpractice.
In 2008, a jury awarded Klotz and his wife $2.5 million.4
Who should bear the cost when medical errors5 such as this oc-
cur?6 Critics of the traditional fee-for-service reimbursement model -
t J.D., Case Western Reserve University of Law, May 2010. M.B.A.,
Weatherhead School of Management at Case Western Reserve University, May 2010.
I am grateful to Professor Sharona Hoffman for her advice and guidance during the
writing of this note.
1 Betsy McCaughey, Hospital Infections: Preventable and Unacceptable,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2008, at A 1l.
2 Id.
3 Id.
5 This Note generally differentiates medical risks from medical errors, or
mistakes. For purposes of this Note, a medical risk is the chance that the patient will
suffer from a known, yet unintended, consequence of care that exists despite proper
care of the doctors and/or staff. An example of a medical risk is the risk of an infec-
tion. In contrast, a medical mistake is a serious breach of proper care. An example of
a medical mistake is an operation on the wrong limb.
6 There is no universally accepted definition of what a medical error is.
However, Albert W. Wu, et al. provide a helpful definition. They define a medical
mistake as "[a] commission or an omission with potentially negative consequences
for the patient that would have been judged wrong by skilled and knowledgeable
peers at the time it occurred, independent of whether there were any negative conse-
quences." Albert W. Wu et al., To Tell The Truth: Ethical and Practical Issues in
Disclosing Medical Mistakes to Patients, 12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 770, 770 (1997).
Though Wu uses the term "mistake" instead of "error," the two are oftentimes used
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in which physicians are paid for each service performed - argue that it
focuses too heavily on the quantity of care given, without regard to
quality, outcomes, or overall costs of care. Thus, they argue that the
traditional model is flawed because it bases a doctor's compensation
on the number of services rendered, instead of the overall health of the
patient.8 In other words, "providers [that] deliver suboptimal care
may end up earning more for subsequent consultations, hospitaliza-
tions, and procedures than those whose skill yields a quick, definitive
diagnosis and cure."9 Some commentators have suggested replacing
the traditional model with a "pay-for-performance model," 0 which
would predicate a physician's pay upon the health of the patient
treated." Accordingly, the doctor would only receive payment if the
treatment proved to be helpful to the patient.
Recently, academics, the government, and the media have all, in
various ways, suggested that a pay-for-performance model would help
reduce preventable medical errors (PMEs). Their suggestions culmi-
nated in a change of the reimbursement policy used by the Centers for
Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) and many private insurers.
In October 2008, CMS halted reimbursements for eight categories of
hospital-acquired conditions (HACs) - conditions that CMS deter-
mined to be serious and reasonably preventable.1 2 In its 2009 final
rule, CMS expanded the number to ten.'3 Generally, these conditions
are widely referred to as Never Events because they are events that
should ideally never happen. 14 As a result, health care payers (includ-
interchangeably. See, e.g., Richard T. Penson et al., Medical Mistakes: A Workshop
on Personal Perspectives, 6 ONCOLOGIST 92, 94 (2001).
7 See William M. Sage, Pay for Performance: Will it Work in Theory?, 3
IND. HEALTH L. REV. 305, 310 (2006).
8 See Robin J. Fisk, What Are Never Events and Why Do
They Matter?, Nov. 6, 2008, http://www.passionforsubro.com/never-events/
what-are-never-events-and-why-do-they-matter/; see also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., ELIMINATING SERIOUS, PREVENTABLE, AND COSTLY MEDICAL
ERRORS - NEVER EVENTS (2006), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/medialpress/release
.asp?Counter-1863.
9 Sage, supra note 7, at 310.
10 Pay for Performance is perhaps best described by William M. Sage as a
system that "[rewards] physicians for health rather than illness." Id. at 307.
11 See id.
12 Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment
Systems, 72 Fed. Reg. 47,130, 47,218 (Aug. 22, 2007) (to be codified at 42 CFR pts.
411,412,413,489).
13 Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, CMS Cuts Number of 'Never Events'For Which it
Won't Pay, Issues Other Rules, 17 BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 1069 (2008).
14 McCaughey, supra note 1.
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ing CMS) subject these conditions to reduced reimbursement and/or
to reporting requirements.15
Refusing to reimburse hospitals for a preventable class of events
should, theoretically, deter hospital complacency to the occurrence of
those events.'6 By making the hospital (instead of the insurance com-
pany, or, alternatively, the patient) bear the costs of a medical error,
the hospital will likely take enhanced preventative measures to avoid
wasted costs that would thereby reduce the occurrence of the events.'
This Never Events policy represents a schism in the health care
community. While CMS and private insurers argue that this policy
will reduce medical errors and improve quality of care,' 8 other com-
mentators have suggested that the Never Events policy will have the
opposite effect and adversely affect care.' 9 In particular, these entities
argue that the Never Events policy will negatively affect fundamental
hospital relationships, such as the physician-client relationship20 and
the hospital-physician relationship. 21 Additionally, they argue that the
Never Events policy will affect malpractice insurance premiums and
coverage22 and will restrict the access of those with poor health to
healthcare services.23
The purpose of this Note is to discuss the history of Never Events
and to illuminate how these events have evolved. This Note begins by
briefly explaining what Never Events are, in broad terms. Section II
explains the creation and evolution of the Never Events policy - trac-
ing it from nonprofit patient advocacy organizations to the federal and
state governments. Section III argues that this policy unfairly punish-
es hospitals by refusing to reimburse for conditions that are not pre-
ventable. Finally, Section IV recommends that CMS should revise its
Never Events policy to include only conditions that hospitals can truly
prevent.
15 See generally Fisk, supra note 8.
16 Id.
17 Hence, by refusing to reimburse the hospitals for the costs of care asso-
ciated with these events, insurers create an incentive for doctors to invest in preventa-
tive measures that could presumably reduce hospitals errors. See id.
18 E.g., Rachel Deutsch, The Federal Role in Reducing Hospital-Acquired
Conditions: Are Medicare Reimbursement Incentives Enough? 42 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROBS. 1 (2008); see also Sheryl Tatar Dasco et al., The "Never Events ": What
It Means For Physicians, 10 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 33, 33 (2008).
19 Dasco et al., supra note 18, at 34.
20 id.
21 id.
22 Id. at 35.
23 CTR. FOR MEDICARE ADVOCACY, INC., CMS TO HOSPITALS: IF IT SHOULD
NEVER HAPPEN, WE WILL NEVER PAY, http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/
InfoByTopic/Reform/Reform_08_09.25.NeverEvents.htm (last visited May 3, 2010).
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I. WHAT ARE NEVER EVENTS?
At a general level, a Never Event is a preventable condition that a
patient acquires at a hospital. By definition, Never Events are sec-
ondary diagnoses, which are conditions concurrent to primary condi-
tions. 2 4 In other words, Never Events are conditions that are distinct
from the condition for which the hospital admitted the patient. Thus,
Never Events are usually thought to be conditions that patients acquire
in a hospital, although, as this Note will show, this belief does not
always prove to be true.25 Accordingly, because a "Never Event"
typically occurs while the patient is in the hospital, it is crucially im-
portant that hospitals correctly diagnose and classify what conditions
its patients present upon admission. To this end, CMS requires that
hospitals indicate when a condition is present on admission through
the use of a claim code.26 Practically, this means that hospitals must
have two specialists on staff: a doctor to diagnose what conditions the
patient has; and a coding specialist, who must rely on the doctor's
notes to determine what claim codes CMS requires.27
Depending on the source, the term can refer to different condi-
tions. For example, the National Quality Forum ("NQF") originally
listed twenty-eight preventable medical errors that it considered Never
Events,2 8 whereas CMS uses the term to refer to ten categories of pre-
ventable HACs.29
24 For an explanation of primary and principal diagnoses, see generally,
JOANN C. ROWELL & MICHELLE A. GREEN, UNDERSTANDING HEALTH INSURANCE: A
GUIDE TO PROFESSIONAL BILLING 123 (7th ed. 2004).
25 This is so because a patient could develop a non-apparent condition before
her admittance to a hospital and unless the condition is detected by the hospital during
admission her condition could be labeled as a "Never Event." For example, a stage-
one pressure ulcer is difficult to detect, especially in individuals with dark skin tones.
WOUND OsToMY & CONTINENCE NURSES Soc'v, POsITION STATEMENT: PRESSURE
ULCER STAGING (2007), http://www.wocn.org/pdfs/WOCNLibrary/Position
Statements/PressureUlcerStaging.pdf.
26 See Fisk, supra note 8.
27 See Linda Wilson, POA Coding Challenges: Concern Grows Over Quality
ofDocumentation, MODERN HEALTHCARE, June 2, 2008, at 10.
28 NAT'L QUALITY FORUM, SERIOUS REPORTABLE EvENTS IN HEALTHCARE -
2006 UPDATE: A CONSENSUS REPORT (2007), http://www.qualityforum.org/
Publications/2007/03/Serious Reportable Events in Healthcare%E2%80%932006
Update.aspx [hereinafter NAT'L QUALITY FORUM 2006].
29 These Hospital Acquired Conditions are: (1) foreign object retained after
surgery; (2) air embolism; (3) blood incompatibility; (4) stage III and IV pressure
ulcers; (5) falls and traumas (fractures, dislocations, intracranial injuries, crushing
injuries, burns and electric shock); (6) manifestations of poor glycemic control (di-
abetic ketoacidosis, nonketotic hyperosmolar coma, hypoglycemic coma, secondary
diabetes with ketoacidosis, secondary diabetes with hyperosmolarity); (7) catheter-
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II. THE BACKGROUND OF NEVER EVENTS
For over ten years, various policy groups have attempted to shed
light on Preventable Medical Errors (PMEs). In 1999, the Institute of
Medicine ("IOM") published To Err is Human: Building a Safer
Health Care System.o In that report, the IOM relied on different
studies that estimated PMEs are responsible for the deaths of up to
98,000 patients each year,' making medical errors a leading cause of
morbidity and mortality in the United States.32 In other words, PMEs
lead to more annual deaths in the United States than breast cancer,
motor vehicles accidents, or AIDS.
In addition, the IOM estimated that the total cost of PMEs falls
somewhere between seventeen and twenty-nine billion dollars.34 In a
follow-up study, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
("CDC") estimated that hospital-acquired infections cost the U.S.
health care system five billion dollars annually. 3 5  Other studies
suggest that hospitals generally do not follow the recommended
guidelines to avoid preventable hospital-acquired infections. 36 Accor-
dingly, these studies suggest that doctors and staff could significantly
reduce costs, save lives, and increase care by simply practicing rigor-
ous hygiene - including washing hands, sterilizing equipment, and
other simple precautions.37  One report in particular suggested that
associated urinary tract infection; (8) vascular catheter-associated infection; (9) sur-
gical site infection following: coronary artery bypass gaft, bariatric surgery (laparos-
copic gastric bypass, gastroenterostomy, laparoscopic gastric restrictive surgery),
orthopedic procedures (spine, neck, shoulder, elbow); and (10) deep vein thrombosis.
Fisk, supra note 8.
30 INST. OF MED., To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000), available at http://orsted.nap.edulopenbook/
0309068371/html/.
3I Id. at 1.
32 Id.; see also Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Pros-
pective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2009 Rates, 73 Fed. Reg. 48,434, 48,471
(Aug. 19, 2008) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411, 412, 413, 422, 489).
3 INST. OF MED., supra note 30, at 1.
34 Id. at 2.
3s Nat'l Inst. of Child Health & Human Dev., Nat'l Inst. of Health, Story of
Discovery: The First Vaccine Against Hospital-Acquired Infection, Sept. 1, 2006,
http://www.nichd.nih.gov/news/resources/discovery/2004/staph.cfn.
36 Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment
Systems and Fiscal Year 2009 Rates, 73 Fed. Reg. at 48,471.
3 See BETSY MCCAUGHEY, UNNECESSARY DEATHS: THE HUMAN AND
FINANCIAL COSTS OF HOSPITAL INFECTIONS 1 (2nd ed. 2006) (summarizing efforts
taken by Denmark, Holland, and Finland that have successfully reduced hospital
infections).
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eighty-seven percent of hospitals fail to take the recommended steps
to avoid four of the most common infections.
Expectedly, these pronouncements reverberated throughout the
health care community.39 Almost immediately afterwards, policy
groups began to draft and discuss solutions that would, hopefully,
decrease the occurrence of PMEs.4 0
In 2002, the National Quality Forum (NQF) 41 released Serious
Reportable Events in Healthcare,42 a report that listed twenty-seven
clearly identifiable and preventable medical errors that posed serious
consequences for patients.4 3 In 2006, NQF updated the list to include
38 The four common infections are aspiration and ventilator associated
pneumonia, central venous catheter related bloodstream infection, surgical site infec-
tion, and influenza (staff vaccination against the flu). Press Release, Leapfrog Group,
Eighty-Seven Percent of Hospitals Do Not Take Recommended Steps to Prevent
Infections (Sept. 10, 2007), http://www.leapfroggroup.org/media/file/Leapfrog
hospital acquired infections release.pdf.
3 E.g., H.T. Stelfox et al., The "To Err is Human" Report and the Patient
Safety Literature, QUALITY & SAFETY HEALTH CARE, Apr. 2006, at 174 (2006); see
also Stephen M. Sullivan et al., Ensuring "Never Events" Never Happen: CMS Halts
Reimbursement to Providers for Certain Conditions, 23 DENNIS BARRY'S
REIMBURSEMENT ADVISOR 3, 3 (2007).
40 See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg & Laurence R. Tancredi, Liability Reform
Should Make Patients Safer: "Avoidable Classes of Events" Are a Key Improvement,
33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 478 (2005) (arguing that Never Events claims should be paid
promptly through an insurance process rather than through adjudication).
41 NQF is a not-for-profit membership group, established to develop and
implement a national strategy for health care quality measurement and reporting.
NQF endorses quality measures for national use through the use of evidence-based
quality information to develop preferred practices for all types of settings. JOINT
COMM'N RES., TOOLS FOR PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT HEALTH CARE: A QUICK
REFERENCE GUIDE 14 (2nd ed. 2008).
42 NAT'L QUALITY FORUM, SERIOUS REPORTABLE EVENTS IN HEALTHCARE: A
CONSENSUS REPORT (2002), http://www.qualityforum.orgfPublications/2002/Serious
ReportableEvents in Healthcare.aspx [hereinafter NAT'L QUALITY FORUM 2002].
43 The 27 events are: unintended retention of a foreign object in a patient
after surgery or other procedure; patient death or serious disability associated with
patient elopement (disappearance); patient death or serious disability associated with
a medication error (e.g., errors involving the wrong drug, wrong dose, wrong patient,
wrong time, wrong rate, wrong preparation or wrong route of administration); patient
death or serious disability associated with a hemolytic reaction due to the administra-
tion of ABO/HLA-incompatible blood or blood products; patient death or serious
disability associated with an electric shock or elective cardioversion while being
cared for in a healthcare facility; patient death or serious disability associated with a
fall while being cared for in a healthcare facility; surgery performed on the wrong
body part; surgery performed on the wrong patient; wrong surgical procedure per-
formed on a patient; intraoperative or immediately post-operative death in an ASA
Class I patient; patient death or serious disability associated with the use of contami-
nated drugs, devices, or biologics provided by the healthcare facility; patient death or
serious disability associated with the use or function of a device in patient care, in
HEAL TH MA TRIX442 [Vol. 20:437
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"artificial insemination with the wrong donor sperm or wrong egg" as
a Never Event, bringing the total number to twenty-eight." The NQF
placed each event under one of six categories, 45 including patient pro-
tection (i.e., infant discharged to the wrong person), criminal events
(i.e., sexual assaults on patients in a healthcare setting), and surgical
events (i.e., surgery performed on the wrong body part), among oth-
46ers.
Notably, the NQF primarily sought to establish a consensus
among healthcare stakeholders about which events to select.47 To
facilitate this, NQF adopted a rigorous screening process to each pro-
posed event and sought a consensus from physicians, hospitals, and
healthcare providers, including "public and private purchasers; na-
tional, regional, state, and local groups representing consumers; ac-
crediting bodies; supporting industries; and organizations involved in
healthcare research or quality improvement." 4 8
which the device is used or functions other than as intended; patient death or serious
disability associated with intravascular air embolism that occurs while being cared for
in a healthcare facility; infant discharged to the wrong person; patient suicide, or
attempted suicide resulting in serious disability, while being cared for in a healthcare
facility; maternal death or serious disability associated with labor or delivery in a low-
risk pregnancy while being cared for in a health care facility; patient death or serious
disability associated with hypoglycemia, the onset of which occurs while the patient
is being cared for in a healthcare facility; death or serious disability (kernicterus)
associated with failure to identify and treat hyperbilirubinemia in neonates; stage 3 or
4 pressure ulcers acquired after admission to a healthcare facility; patient death or
serious disability due to spinal manipulative therapy; any incident in which a line
designated for oxygen or other gas to be delivered to a patient contains the wrong gas
or is contaminated by toxic substance; patient death or serious disability associated
with a burn incurred from any source while being cared for in a healthcare facility;
patient death or serious disability associated with the use of restraints or bedrails
while being cared for in a healthcare facility; any instance of care ordered by or pro-
vided by someone impersonating a physician, nurse, pharmacist, or other licensed
healthcare provider; abduction of a patient of any age; sexual assault on a patient
within or on the grounds of the healthcare facility; and death or significant injury of a
patient or staff member resulting from a physical assault (i.e., battery) that occurs
within or on the grounds of the healthcare facility. See id. at 6-7.
4 NAT'L QUALITY FORUM 2006, supra note 28, at 14.
45 The categories are: surgical, product of device, patient protection,
care management, environment, or criminal. NAT'L QUALITY FORUM, SERIOUS
REPORTABLE EVENTS (SREs): TRANSPARENCY & ACCOUNTABILITY ARE CRITICAL TO
REDUCING MEDICAL ERRORS, http://www.lumetrasolutions.com/uploadedFiles/
consulting/about-lumetra/enewsletters/lqi/about-lumetra/NQF NeverEvents
Factsheet%281%29.pdf (last visited May 3, 2010) [hereinafter NAT'L QUALITY
FORUM SRE].
4 Id.
47 See NAT'L QUALITY FORUM 2006, supra note 28, at 2.
48 See NAT'L QUALITY FORUM SRE, supra note 45.
4432010]
The 2006 NQF report termed these conditions "serious reportable
events" or Never Events, indicating that these events should never
happen in a hospital. 4 In reality, NQF applied a lower than "never"
standard - stating that the conditions need be "largely preventable,
and very serious."o NQF hoped that the list would be the basis for a
nationwide reporting system that would subsequently reduce the oc-
currence of these events.
Soon after, other organizations began to support similar initia-
tives. For example, the Leapfrog Group for Patient Safety52 endorsed
the NQF's list of Never Events.53 Additionally, Leapfrog announced
that it would publicly recognize hospitals that: (1) apologized to the
patient/family affected by the event; (2) reported the event to at least
one reporting agency; (3) performed a root cause analysis; and (4)
waived all costs directly related to the event. 54 Leapfrog has subse-
quently encouraged its members to support its policy, leading to pub-
lic support of the plan by Aetna, GM, IBM, and others.
States also adopted similar policies. In 2003, Minnesota began
requiring hospitals to report the original twenty-eight Never Events as
described by the NQF. As of July 2008, nearly half of the hospitals
participating in a Leapfrog survey have adopted Leapfrog policies. 5 7
In addition, hospital associations from Vermont, Massachusetts, and
Washington have since agreed to stop billing for all or part of the er-
49 LEAP FROG GROUP, FACTSHEET: NEVER EVENTS (2008).
so Press Release, The Nat'l Quality Forum, National Quality Forum Updates
Endorsement of Serious Reportable Events in Healthcare 1 (Oct. 16, 2006),
http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/WSJPRSeriousReportableEvents
10-15-06.pdf.
52 Leapfrog Group for Patient Safety is an advocacy group that represents
many of the nation's largest corporations and purchasers of health benefits with a
stated goal of "mobilizing employer purchasing power to alert America's health in-
dustry that big leaps in health care safety, quality and customer value will be recog-
nized and rewarded." Leapfrog Group, About Us, http://www.leapfroggroup.org/
about us (last visited May 3, 2010).
5 Leapfrog Group, Leapfrog Group Position Statement on Never Events,
http://www.leapfroggroup.org/for hospitals/leapfroghospitalqualityand safety
survey copy/never events (last visited May 3, 2010).
54 id
56 MINNESOTA DEP'T OF HEALTH, ADVERSE HEALTH EVENTS IN MINNESOTA:
5TH ANNUAL PUBLIC REPORT 1 (2009), http://www.health.state.mn.us/patientsafety/
ae/09ahereport.pdf
5 Press Release, Nat'l Bus. Coal. on Health, National Business Coalition on
Health Endorses New CMS 'Never Events' Policy (Sept. 29, 2008), http://nbch.org/
index.asp?bid=78.
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rors identified by NQF.ss State Medicaid programs have also begun
to follow suit. For example, both Pennsylvania and New York an-
nounced that they would terminate reimbursement for PMEs because
they were not medically necessary to treat illnesses.59
Private insurers have also taken notice of Never Events. Well-
Point and CIGNA announced that they would cease to pay hospitals
when "serious preventable errors" occur.60  Specifically, CIGNA
would discontinue payments for conditions that could have been
avoided by use of widely accepted industry standard procedures. 6 1
The Federal Government soon began to take similar actions to re-
duce preventable medical errors. Most notably, Congress passed the
Deficit Reduction Act of 200562 ("DRA"), which aimed to cut Medi-
caid and Medicare expenses by requiring the Secretary of Human
Health and Services to choose at least two "high-cost or high-volume"
preventable, hospital-acquired conditions that the CMS would no
longer reimburse. The DRA required that any the condition had to
meet at least two out of the three guidelines:
(1) be either high cost, high volume, or both;
(2) be reasonably preventable through the application of evi-
dence-based guidelines;" and
58 Fisk, supra note 8.
s9 JoNel Aleccia, More States Shred Bills for Awful Medical Errors,
MSNBC.com, Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26081421.
60 Cigna denies complete reimbursement for serious preventable errors and
grants only partial reimbursement for "avoidable hospital conditions." Cigna defines
serious preventable errors as "surgical procedures that are performed on the wrong
side, wrong site, wrong body part or wrong person." Cigna defines avoidable hospital
conditions as: "objects left inside a patient during surgery; air embolism, or sudden
artery blockage from air bubbles introduced during surgery; use of the wrong blood
type during transfusions; infections from urinary catheters; pressure ulcers, also
known as bed sores; infections from central vein catheters; mediastinitis, an often
fatal inflammation in lung tissue; and hospital-acquired injuries, such as fractures,
dislocations, and bums." CIGNA HEALTHCARE, PROMOTING PATIENT SAFETY: CIGNA
To STOP REIMBURSING HOSPITALS FOR NEVER EVENTS AND AVOIDABLE HOSPITAL
CONDITIONS (2008), http://newsroom.cigna.com/article-display.cfm?article-id=888.
61 Fisk, supra note 8.
62 The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395ww(d)(4)(D)(iv) (2007).
63 Id.
6 § 1395 ww(d)(4)(D)(iv)(I-II) (2006). In explaining "evidence-based
guidelines," CMS stated: "[s]elected conditions must be considered reasonably pre-
ventable through the application of evidence-based guidelines. By reviewing guide-
lines from professional organizations, academic institutions, and entities ... we eva-
luated whether guidelines are available that hospitals should follow to prevent the
condition from occurring in the hospital." Thus, evidence-based guidelines might be
described as any guidelines that would help a hospital avoid these events. Medicare
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(3) have a diagnosis code that clearly identified the condition
and assigned the patient to a higher pay rate.
In its 2008 proposed rule, CMS initially considered adopting fourteen
categories of HACs that the CMS would exclude from reimbursement
and invited the public to comment to ensure that the events complied
with the standards set by the DRA.66 CMS further distinguished four
of the proposed HACs as "serious preventable events" 67 because these
conditions originated from the NQF's original list of Never Events.68
These conditions are as follows: leaving an object in a patient; per-
forming the wrong surgery on a patient (surgery on the wrong body
part, wrong patient, or the wrong surgery); failing to prevent air em-
bolisms following certain surgeries; and providing incompatible blood
or blood products to patients.
In its 2008 Final Rule, CMS responded to the public comments
and chose the following categories of HACs: (1) catheter-associated
urinary tract infection (UTI);70 (2) pressure ulcers; 71 (3) serious pre-
Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal
Year 2009 Rates, 73 Fed. Reg. 23,527, 23,549 (Apr. 30, 2008) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pts. 411, 412, 413 et al.). A guideline is evidence-based if it is based on clini-
cal research. Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Pay-
ment Systems and Fiscal Year 2009 Rates, 73 Fed. Reg. 48,434, 48,474 (Aug. 19,
2008) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411, 412, 413, 422, 489). CMS did not further
define the reasonably preventable standard or list any criteria that would make a
condition reasonably preventable. CMS simply stated that the DRA "does not require
that a condition be 'always preventable' in order to qualify as an HAC" and that rea-
sonably preventable ". . . implies something less than 100%." Id.
65 Medicare Program; Proposed Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospec-
tive Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2008 Rates, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,679, 24,716 (pro-
posed May 3, 2007) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411, 412, 413, 489). For an
explanation of diagnosis-related groups and the IPPS reimbursement, see generally id.
at 24,716-24,718.
66 id
67 Id. at 24,718.
68 Although NQF also lists "Stage 3 or 4 Pressure Ulcers" as a Never Event,
CMS confusingly does not list Pressure Ulcers as an SPE. See NAT'L QUALITY
FORUM 2006, supra note 28, at 14.
69 See Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective
Payment Systems, 72 Fed. Reg. 47,130, 47,218 (Aug. 22, 2007) (to be codified at 42
CFR pts. 411, 412, 413, 489).
70 Catheter-Associated UTI is the most common type of healthcare-related
infection. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, AN OVERVIEW OF CATHETER-
ASSOCIATED URINARY TRACT INFECTIONS (UTI) (2009), http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/
dhqp/dpac uti.html.
7 A pressure ulcer is a wound in the skin that can be caused by pressure
from sitting or lying in one place too long. NAT'L HEALTH QUALITY CAMPAIGN,
PRESSURE ULCER FACT SHEET (2008), http://www.nhqualitycampaign.org/files/
factsheets/StafP/%20Fact/20Sheet/O20-%20Reducing%20Pressure%20UIcers.pdf
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ventable event - foreign object left in the body after surgery; (4) se-
rious preventable event - air embolism; 72 (5) serious preventable
event - blood incompatibility; (6) vascular catheter-associated infec-
tion; (7) falls/bums/crushing injuries; and (8) surgical site infections
following coronary artery bypass graft surgery.73
The next year, CMS selected two additional conditions - manife-
stations of poor control of blood sugar level and deep vein thrombosis
(pulmonary embolism).7 4 CMS also expanded the category of "Sur-
gical Site Infections" to include infections following certain elective
procedures.75 With the addition of these two categories, CMS brought
the total number of HACs to ten.76
In order to understand the effect that the Never Events policy will
have, it is necessary to possess a brief understanding of how CMS
reimbursement policy.77 CMS reimburses hospitals through the Inpa-
tient Prospective Payment System (IPPS).7 8 IPPS bases payment
upon specific, prearranged rates for hospital care. 79 Typically, IPPS
72 Air embolisms result from gas bubbles entering the arteries, veins or capil-
laries. This results in poor oxygen delivery to the areas supplied by the affected
circulation and can lead to death. Undersea & Hyperbaric Med. Soc'y, Air or Gas
Embolism, http://www.uhms.orgfResourceLibrary/Indications/AirorGasEmbolism/
tabid/271/Default.aspx (last visited May 3, 2010).
7 Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment
Systems, 72 Fed. Reg. at 47,217-47,218. In addition, the following were considered
but not chosen: (1) ventilator-associated pneumonia; (2) staphylococcus aureus septi-
cemia; (3) deep vein thrombosis/pulmonary embolism; (4) methicillin-resistant sta-
phylococcus aureus; (5) clostridium difficile; and (6) wrong surgery. Id.
74 Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment
Systems and Fiscal Year 2009 Rates, 73 Fed. Reg. 48,434, 48,475 48,489 48,481.
(Aug. 19, 2008) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411, 412, 413, 422, 489).
75 Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment
Systems and Fiscal Year 2009 Rates, 73 Fed. Reg. at 48,477 48,478 48,479. CMS
proposed nine conditions originally, but ended up only selecting two. The nine condi-
tions it proposed are: (1) surgical site infections following certain elective procedures;
(2) Legionnaires' Disease; (3) extreme blood sugar derangement; (4) collapse of the
lung resulting from medical treatment; (5) delirium; (6) ventilator-associated pneu-
monia; (7) deep vein thrombosis/pulmonary embolism; (8) staph infection in the
bloodstream; and (9) Clostridium Difficile-Associated Disease ("CDAD"). Id. at
48,433-49,083.
76 Sage, supra note 7, at 307; see also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., HOSPITAL-ACQUIRED CONDITIONs, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/HospitalAcq
Cond/06 Hospital-Acquired Conditions.asp (last visited May 3, 2010).
n See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ACUTE INPATIENT
PPS: OVERVIEW (2009), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/acuteinpatientpps/ (describing the
payment system for operating costs of acute care hospital impatient stays under Medi-
care based on prospectively set rates).
78 ids
79 Fisk, supra note 8; Medicare Program; Proposed Changes to the Hospital
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does not take into account the length of the hospital stay.o When a
hospital admits a Medicare-insured patient, the hospital must classify
the patient's conditions into a diagnosis-related group (a classification
with pre-arranged reimbursement rates) and report the primary8 and
secondary82 diagnoses.8 3 When the coding for a Never Event appears
during hospitalization, CMS will no longer pay the higher rate for
treating the condition unless the present-on-admission code is
present.84 If the code is not present, Medicare assumes that the condi-
tion was hospital-acquired and refuses to pay for the higher reim-
bursement rates.85
III. THE DIFFERENT STANDARDS
OF NEVER EVENTS
As previously indicated, the Never Events concept has evolved
over time and so has the list of conditions and events to which that the
label applies.86 Accordingly, as the list changed, so did the standard
used by the organization to compile that list. This section will argue
that the standard CMS used to compile its list of Never Events was
vastly different than the standard used by its predecessors, specifically
the NQF.8 7
When NQF adopts a plan, it signifies that the plan has gone
through a rigorous vetting process and that its "science . . . and its
salience in public reporting have been verified .... This vetting
process involves collaboration with all areas of the health care indus-
try - including providers, insurers, employers, consumer groups, pro-
fessional associations, and labor unions. 89 NQF refers to its consensus
Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2008 Rates, 72 Fed. Reg.
24679 (May 3, 2007).
80 id
A "primary diagnosis is the most significant condition for which services
and/or procedures were provided." ROWELL & GREEN, supra note 24, at 123.
82 A secondary diagnosis encompasses any concurrent condition that coexists
with the primary diagnosis and includes complications - usually conditions that de-
velop subsequent to inpatient admission. Id.
83 See Dave Carpenter, 'Never' Land, Hosp. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Nov.
2007, at 34, 37-38.
84 Fisk, supra note 8.
85 id
86 Cf NAT'L QUALITY FORUM 2002, supra note 42, with Fisk, supra note 8.
87 Id.
88 Jean DerGurahian, New Rules Drawing Fire: Hospitals Say CMS' New
Policies Lack Direction, 38 MOD. HEALTHCARE 8, 8 (2008).
8 JOINT COMM'N RES., supra note 50.
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standards as the "gold standard" for the measurement of health care
quality.90
The same cannot be said about CMS's vetting process. Whereas
NQF strives for consensus among the health care industry, CMS seeks
consensus within the Department of Human and Health Services and
other federal departments.9' As a result, NQF chooses conditions that
medical professionals could easily prevent; whereas CMS chooses
conditions that it could easily categorize and define. 92 Perhaps unsur-
prisingly, commentators have criticized CMS for its selection process
and questioned whether hospitals could actually reduce the occurrence
of these events by following CMS's suggestions.93
This distinction is significant, as NQF's list of Never Events
would ultimately improve hospital care because each event meets two
out of three key characteristics. First, that it is completely avoidable;
second, that it is the result of a medical mistake - not simply a risk of
hospitalization or an illness; and third, that it is avoidable through the
adoption of simple, practical guidelines. As this section will demon-
strate, by using a different standard to select Never Events, CMS
chose events that are not avoidable, that are not the result of a medical
mistake, and that do not have sufficient prevention guidelines to assist
the hospital in averting the occurrence of an event.
This section begins by examining the standard set by NQF by ana-
lyzing two conditions it adopted as Never Events: "Wrong Site Sur-
gery" and "Foreign Object Retained in the Body Following Surgery."
Then, this section analyzes two of the CMS Never Events - "Catheter-
Associated Urinary Tract Infections," and "Trauma Caused by Falls."
Comparing the two standards, this section then contrasts the two stan-
dards to demonstrate how CMS's standard departs from that originally
set by NQF.9 4
90 Press Release, Nat'l Quality Forum, National Quality Forum Endorses
Consensus Standards for Quality of Hospital Care (May 15, 2008),
http://www.qualityforum.org/NewsAndResources/PressReleases/2008/
NATIONALQUALITY FORUM ENDORSESCONSENSUS STANDARDS
FOR QUALITY OFHOSPITALCARE.aspx.
91 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., THE RULE MAKING PROCESS
FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SIMPLIFICATION: WHAT Is TAKING So LONG?, http://www.cms
.hhs.gov/HIPAAGenInfo/Downloads/RuleMakingProcess.pdf (last visited May 3,
2010).
92 See DerGurahian, supra note 88.
9 See id.
94 Some commentators have expressed concerns that the Never Events policy
could affect medical malpractice suits. See Charles D. Brown et al., Litigation Impact
of Never Events, HEALTH LAW. NEWS, Feb. 2008, at 27, available at
http://www.fulbright.com/images/publications/Never/o20Events%20Article.pdf
Never Events would likely only aid plaintiffs as a means of discrediting an expert
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witness or in support for the argument that the Never Events extend an already-
existing inference of negligence.
First, Never Events could serve to discredit an expert witness. Id. Consider a scena-
rio in which an elderly woman, recovering from hip displacement, voluntarily leaves
her hospital bed and falls, even though the hospital staff implemented all proper fall
precautions. Id. at 27.
As a result of the fall, the elderly woman suffers painful and costly injuries and sues
the hospital for negligence. Id. The hospital would rely on an expert witness to argue
that the staff did not act unreasonably. The plaintiff could pose the following line of
questioning:
Ms. Expert, you have testified that you believe that falls can occur
even where no negligence has occurred? You believe that not all falls are
preventable? Are you aware that CMS has studied this precise issue?
Id. at 28. Facing this line of questioning, the expert witness has two choices. Id
She could admit that she is aware that CMS determined that falls are reasonably
preventable through the application of evidence-based guidelines; or admit that
she is unaware of CMS's reimbursement policy which could make her look
"unqualified, incompetent, and uninformed." Id.
Secondly, a plaintiff might argue that Never Events create a rebuttable inference of
negligence. Several states adopt a rebuttable inference of negligence for two Never
Events - when a foreign object was unintentionally left within the body of the patient
following surgery; and when a surgical procedure was performed on the wrong pa-
tient, wrong limb or part of the patient's body. Lisa Frye Garrison, Addressing the
Potential Litigation Impacts of CMS's "Never Events" Rules, http://www
.healthcarelawnote.com/media/20080516 handout.pdf (last visited May 3, 2010). A
plaintiff could attempt to extend a similar rebuttable inference of negligence to all of
the Never Events- and argue that CMS's refusal to reimburse a hospital implies a
liability determination.
As a solution, states might consider the implementation of legislation that excludes
the use of Never Events determinations as evidence of negligence of the hospital staff.
A strong precedent for this is set by the so-called "apology laws." See Marlynn Wei,
Doctors, Apologies and the Law: An Analysis and Critique of Apology Laws, 39 J.
HEALTH L. 104 (2006). These laws exclude apologies from court as evidence of a
doctor's liability. Id. In other words, as a result of these laws, a doctor can apologize
for mistakes to his patient without legal liability implications. MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN
& DALE A. NANCE, MEDICAL INJUSTICE: THE CASE AGAINST HEALTH COURTS 98
(2007). Supporters of these laws believe that an apology would encourage doctors to
disclose errors to patients, and force both parties to move towards reconciliation.
Wei, supra, at 108.
Never Events share two important similarities to apologies. First, like apology-laws,
Never Events were adopted for larger policy reasons - a cost-cutting measure and an
incentive for hospitals to improve care - and not as an allocation or indication of
fault. Second, like apology-laws, by removing Never Events from the courtroom,
states would be encouraging disclosure and reconciliation. Specifically, legislatures
would be encouraging the accurate reporting of preventable medical errors. Accor-
dingly, legislatures should enact laws that forbid Never Events from being admitted
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A. Foreign Objects Retained in the Body Following Surgery
Take, for example, "Foreign Objects Retained in the Body Fol-
lowing Surgery", a condition on the original NQF list.9 5 Medical pro-
fessionals accidentally leave a foreign object in a patient's body in
one out of every thousand to fifteen hundred intra-abdominal opera-
tions.9 6 One report suggests that foreign objects are left nearly indi-
scriminately throughout the body and in every major cavity following
surgery. 97 Sponges are the most common objects left in the body fol-
lowing surgery, accounting for seventy percent of these events.98
Other common objects include towels, instruments and sharps, and
device fragments, including pieces of wire or tubes.99 Further, reten-
tion of a foreign object is nine times as likely to occur in an emergen-
cy operation and four times as likely to occur when an operation in-
volves an unexpected change in procedure. 00
This condition demonstrates three important characteristics about
the standard that NQF used in selecting a list. First, the event has
serious consequences upon the patient. In the present example, leav-
ing a foreign object in the body of a patient has very serious repercus-
sions on that patient's healtho and may even lead to death. 102 A
study in the New England Journal of Medicine examined twenty-four
cases where a foreign object was accidentally left in the abdominal
cavity following surgery.'0o In the twenty-four observed cases, all the
patients suffered from serious complications arising from the retained
object, and two of the patients died as a result of the foreign object.1 04
Other common adverse results include readmission to the hospital,
as evidence in court.
9 NAT'L QUALITY FORUM 2002, supra note 42; see supra note 43.
96 Atul A. Gawande et al., Risk Factors for Retained Instruments and
Sponges After Surgery, 348 NEw ENG. J. MED. 229, 230 (2003).
97 See id. at 231.
9 A. Gonzalez-Ojeda et al., Retained Foreign Bodies Following Intra-
Abdominal Surgery, 46 HEPATO-GASTROENTEROLOGY 808 (1999).
99 Petra S. Berger & Gordon Sanders, Objects Retained During Surgery:
Human Diligence Meets Systems Solutions, PATIENT SAFETY & QUALITY HEALTHCARE
NEWSLETTER (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.psqh.com/sepoct08/objects.html.
100 Gawande, supra note 96, at 232.
101 Cedars-Sinai Health Sys., Elimination of Retained Foreign Objects Task
Force, http://www.csmc.educ/pf 11 749.html (last visited May 3, 2010).
102 A. Lincourt et al., Retained Foreign Bodies After Surgery, 138 J.
SURGICAL REs. 170 (2007).
103 Gonzalez-Ojeda et al., supra note 98.
1' Id.
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additional surgery, infection, and small-bowel obstruction.os Fmian-
cially, the costs of removing a foreign object can be extremely costly
- costs can run up to $50,000 per incident. 106
Second, the event is always the result of a hospital mistake. In
other words, a foreign object retained in the body following surgery is
"a medical error that should never happen, not a risk that every patient
must accept." 0 7 Of the twenty-four cases, neither the hospital (where
the operation occurred) nor the surgeons (who performed the opera-
tion) recognized that they had left an instrument inside the patient. 08
Instead, the hospitals discovered the error after the patients reported a
wide array of symptoms to their physicians, including non-specified
abdominal pain, persistent sinus, intra-abdominal sepsis, and vaginal
discharge.' 09
Third, the event is avoidable. Many commentators consider the
retention of sponges and foreign instruments in the body a completely
avoidable event.o The American College of Surgeons recommends
the following guidelines to prevent the retention of objects in the body
following surgery: (1) standardized counting procedures for sponges,
sharps, instruments; (2) methodical wound exploration exploring
wounds before closure; and (3) effective communication among oper-
ative team members.'1 ' A report in the New England Journal ofMed-
icine suggests that by standardizing counting procedures for medical
instruments, such as designating team members responsible to me-
thodically explore the wound before closure, hospital staff could
greatly reduce any possibility of leaving a foreign object in a body
following an operation.'12 Further, the U.S. Food and Drug Adminis-
tration suggests that if medical professionals were to merely inspect
devices prior to and immediately following usage, they would be able
to determine whether the instrument was likely to be, or had been,
damaged during surgery, a leading cause of retention."
105 Berger & Sanders, supra note 99.
106 Gawande, supra note 96, at 232.
107 See generally John R. Clarke et al., Getting Surgery Right, 246 ANNALS
SURGERY 395 (2007) (reporting on state-wide incidents of wrong-site surgery in hos-
pitals and ambulatory surgical centers).
108 Id.
109 Id
110 Lincourt et al., supra note 102.
"1 R.R. Cima et al., Incidence and Characteristics of Potential and Actual
Retained Foreign Object Events in Surgical Patients, 207 J. AM. C. SURGEONS (2008).
112 Gawande et al., supra note 96, at 234; see also Cima, supra note 111.
"' U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Public Health Notification: Unretrieved De-
vice Fragments (Jan. 15, 2008), http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/safety/0I 1508-udf.html.
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Thus, by analyzing "Foreign Objects Retained in a Body Follow-
ing Surgery," one can learn a great deal about the high standard set by
NQF in its selection of Never Events. Namely, that this event fits
three important requirements. First, that the event is completely
avoidable; 1l4 second, the event is always the result of a medical mis-
take - not the result of hospitalization or an illness;' 15 and third, the
event is avertable through the adoption of simple, practical guide-
lines." 6
B. Wrong-Site Surgery
Similarly, other NQF Never Events exhibit the same high stan-
dard. For example, the NQF also vetted "surgery performed on the
wrong body part" (or "wrong-site surgery") before selecting it as a
Never Event.'"7 In so doing, NQF ensured that it selected an event
that was completely avoidable; the result of medical mistakes; and
avertable through simple guidelines.
A 2006 study by the Archives of Surgery, which examined
over two million malpractice liability cases in Massachusetts over a
twenty-year period, estimated that non-spine wrong-site surgery oc-
curs once in nearly one hundred thirteen thousand operations.' If
this statistic holds up nationally, it would mean that throughout the
country "wrong-site surgery was reported to insurance companies or a
lawsuit was filed once every five to ten years at any one hospital."19
According to the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health-
care Organizations ("JCAHO"), the number of wrong-site surgeries
increased during the years 1996 through 2002.120 Wishing to counter-
114 Lincourt et al., supra note 102.
115 Gwande, supra note 96.
116 id.
1" Of the four NQF events that CMS considered adopting in its 2008 pro-
posed rule, wrong-site surgery is the only one that CMS did not select. Although
commentators strongly urged for its adoption as an HAC, CMS could not fit the event
into its pre-existing codes. See Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient
Prospective Payment Systems, 72 Fed. Reg. 47,130, 47,218 (Aug. 22, 2007) (to be
codified at 42 CFR pts. 411, 412, 413, and 489). However, some state Medicaid
programs still received reimbursement requests for wrong-site surgery. See Medical
News Today, New York Medicaid Program to Stop Reimbursing Hospitals for Pre-
ventable Errors (June 11, 2008), http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/1 10769
.php.
118 Mary R. Kwaan et al., Incidence, Patterns, and Prevention of Wrong-Site
Surgery, 141 ARCHIVES SURGERY 353, 354 (2006).
119 Clarke et al., supra note 107, at 395.
120 See Nancy M. Saufl, Sentinel Event: Wrong-Site Surgery, 17 J.
PERIANESTHESIA NURSING 420, 420 (2002).
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act this trend, JCAHO identified a number of factors that increased the
risk of wrong-site surgeries.121 Increased risk was present when more
than one surgeon was involved in the operation, when surgeons per-
formed multiple procedures on a patient during a single operation,
when unusual time pressures were involved, when emergencies and
operations involved unusual patient characteristics.122 JCAHO named
communication breakdowns as the leading cause of wrong-site surge-
ries. 123 Put another way, wrong-site surgery is a reflection of "the
accuracy and completeness of information brought to the point of
care, the quality of professional communication, and the degree of
teamwork among the members of the operating team."1 24
As noted, wrong-site surgery is rare, making it difficult to evalu-
ate the effectiveness of guidelines.125  However, JCAHO refers to
certain protocols as baselines upon which all hospitals would be able
to build.126 These protocols are applicable to all settings127 and in-
clude three independent verifications of the surgical site,128 unequivo-
cally marking the operation site,129 and ensuring agreement of the
procedure with the operating surgeon, anesthesiologist, and circulat-
ing nurses.130 Confirming this, an article in the Permanente Journal
suggests that a simple pre-operation discussion with operation staff
could have a significant impact on reducing the occurrence of wrong-
site surgeries.131 Further, the Annals of Surgery study found that hos-
pital staff could have prevented over sixty percent of the incidents by
following standard hospital protocol, such as marking the operation
site before surgery, using a preoperative verification process, and re-
solving uncertainties with staff through proper communication.132
121 id.
122 id.
123 Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Healthcare Orgs., Sentinel Event Alert:
A Follow-up Review of Wrong Site Surgery (2001), http://www.jointcommission.org/
SentinelEvents/SentinelEventAlert/sea_24.htm.
124 Clarke et al., supra note 107, at 402.
125 Martin A. Makary et al., Operating Room Briefings and Wrong-Site Sur-
gery, 204 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 236, 236 (2007) (citing Martin A. Makary, Patient
Safety in Surgery, 243 ANNALS SURGERY 628, 628 (2006)).
126 Joint Comm'n on Accreditation, supra note 123.
127 Id.
128 Press Release, N.Y. State Dep't of Health, New York State Health
Department Releases Pre-Operative Protocols to Enhance Safe Surgical Care (Feb. 8,
2001), http://www.health.state.ny.us/press/releases/2001/preop.htm.
129 id
130 Id.
1' James Defontes & Stephanie Surbida, Preoperative Safety Briefing
Project, 8 PERMANENTE J. 21 (2004).
132 Kwaan et al., supra note 118, at 355.
454 [Vol. 20:437
NEVER SAY NEVER: "NEVER EVENTS" IN MEDICARE
As with "Foreign Retention of Objects in the Body Following
Surgery," one can learn a great deal about the high standard set by
NQF in its selection of Never Events. First, wrong-site surgery is an
avoidable event. Second, wrong-site surgery is "a medical error that
should never happen, it is not a medical risk that a patient must accept
. . . .,133 It is often the direct result of negligence by the doctors and
staff, or the result of a communication breakdown between members
of the operating team. 134 Third, that a hospital could completely
avoid wrong-site surgery through the use of simple guidelines.1 35
Here, again, NQF chose an event that met the same three key charac-
teristics - the event is avoidable; the result of a medical error; and is
avertable through the adoption of simple guidelines.
C. The Standard Set by CMS
As this section will demonstrate, CMS's list of Never Events de-
monstrates a much lower standard than that applied by the NQF.13 6
Accordingly, though CMS asserts that its list of Never Events are rea-
sonably preventable through evidence-based guidelines, some com-
mentators have suggested that CMS abandoned, to a great deal, the
consensus that the National Quality Forum (NQF) used as a frame-
work to select the original list of Never Events.' 37
Notably, there are serious problems with the evidence-based
guidelines that CMS advocates.'3 8 As discussed in Section II, one of
133 Clarke et al., supra note 107, at 395.
134 Cf Defontes et al., supra note 131 (addressing the problems of wrong
anatomical site or wrong patient surgical procedures through an improved climate of
communication among members on the surgical team).
135 See generally Clarke et al., supra note 107.
136 CMS focuses largely on the costs of care, which may not be synonymous
with the standard of care. Accordingly, CMS selects events that have high costs over
events that a hospital could truly prevent and could thereby improve the standard of
care.
137 See DerGurahian, supra note 88.
138 Critics have pointed out numerous concerns with evidence-based guide-
lines in general. See generally Carter L. Williams, Evidence-Based Medicine in the
Law Beyond Clinical Practice Guidelines: What Effect Will EBM Have on the Stan-
dard of Care?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 479 (2004). For example, evidence-based
guidelines do not reflect common clinical experience, and advocate inconsistent legal
standards. Id. at 500 (stating that the "current standard of care analysis is potentially
inconsistent with the practice of evidence-based medicine"). Accordingly, CMS's
second criteria for the selection a Never Event - that it be reasonably preventable
through the application of evidence-based guidelines - does not necessarily reflect a
widely approved standard in the medical profession. In other words, what CMS ad-
vocates as an evidence-based guideline may be contrary to medical standards of care.
Id. Accordingly, a hospital that is faced with the possibility of a Never Event would
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the DRA's requirements was that any HAC that CMS chose must
"reasonably have been prevented through the application of evidence-
based guidelines."l 39
This is the case for three reasons. First, CMS often chose condi-
tions that are not preventable. In other words, they are conditions that
would occur even with proper medical care. Second, the HACs are
often the result of ordinary medical risks and not, as was the case with
the NQF list, the result of a medical mistake. Third, CMS advocates
that hospitals adopt evidence-based guidelines (to avoid the occur-
rence of a HAG) that are often vague and inapplicable. As a result,
CMS financially punishes a hospital for events that are beyond the
hospital's control and for not following unrealistic, inapplicable
guidelines. This section illustrates the effect of this change by analyz-
ing two of the events chose by CMS - urinary tract infection and
"Injuries Sustained from Falls."
1. Catheter-Associated Urinary Tract Infection (UTI)
At first glance, catheter-associated urinary tract infection (UTI)
might seem like a strong candidate to be included as a Never Event -
it affects a common necessity of hospitalization - the use of a cathe-
terl40 - and is among the most common infections in acute and long-
term care facilities 4 1 -- affecting between six hundred thousand to one
million patients a year. 142 Of the original thirteen conditions it pro-
posed, CMS believed that this condition best met the criteria for an
HAC.14 3 Further, catheters are among the most widely used devices in
hospitals.'" Moreover, the consequences of a UTI can be devastating,
ranging from an additional day of hospital care to death.145 Addition-
have two choices: institute a standard contrary to the medical standards of care (and
thereby open itself up to tort litigation) or provide the patient proper care without
hope for reimbursement.
13 Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, supra note 62.
14 An estimated twenty-five million indwelling urethral catheters sold in the
United States annually. Sanjay Saint et al., Are Physicians Aware of Which of Their
Patients Have Indwelling Urinary Catheters?, 109 AM. J. MED. 476, 476 (2000).
141 KENRAD E. NELSON & CAROLYN M. WILLIAMS, INFECTIOUS DISEASE
EPIDEMIOLOGY THEORY AND PRACTICE 522 (2nd ed. 2007).
142 Heidi L. Wald & Andrew M. Kramer, Nonpayment for Harms Resulting in
Medical Care: Catheter-Associated Urinary Tract Infections, 298 JAMA 2782, 2783
(2007).
143 Medicare Program; Proposed Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospec-
tive Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2008 Rates, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,719-24,720.
144 id
145 Saint et al., supra note 140, at 476.
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ally, UTIs have a large financial impact - costing the health care sys-
tem an estimated $400 million annually. 14 6
However, CMS there are two main problems here. First, UTI is
not an avoidable through proper care of the hospital staff, and second,
it is often a medical risk of hospitalization. In fact, CMS admits that
most clinicians and infectious disease control experts do not believe
that catheter-associated UTIs are preventable. 14 7 Many of the contri-
buting factors of UTI are outside the control of the hospital staff.148
The risk of developing a catheter-associated UTI depends, in part,
upon two several key factors, among them the duration of the catheter
once in place, the patient's susceptibility to infection. 14 9 UTIs are
generally considered unavoidable when a catheter is left in the pa-
tients for more than four days because of the buildup of bacteria.5 o
Thus, patients who require intermediate or long-term use of catheters
and/or are confined to a hospital bed have a baseline rate of acquiring
a UTI.'
Additionally, CMS does not provide simple guidelines that would
enable medical professionals to avoid UTIs. CMS instead relies
largely upon evidence-based guidelines that were set by a
twenty-eight-year-old CDC report.152 That report asserts prevention
guidelines that presume that hospitals could avoid UTIs by properly
managing an indwelling catheter, 53 by limiting the duration of cathe-
ter placements, and by only using catheters when necessary. 154 Proper
management, according to that report, includes such actions as cathe-
146 APIC, Guide to the Elimination of Catheter-Associated Urinary
Tract Infections 32 2008), http://www.apic.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Practice
Guidance/APICEliminationGuides/CAUTIGuide_0609.pdf
147 Medicare Program; Proposed Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospec-
tive Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2008 Rates, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,719.
148 APIC, supra note 146, at 8.
149 id
Io Medicare Program; Proposed Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospec-
tive Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2008 Rates, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,719.
1s1 Wald & Kramer, supra note 142.
152 The report that CDC relies upon is EDWARD S. WONG, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDELINE FOR
PREVENTION OF CATHETER-ASSOCIATED URINARY TRACT INFECTIONS (1981), available
at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/gl catheter assoc.html; see Medicare Program;
Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems, 72 Fed. Reg. 47,130,
47,203-47,204. (Aug. 22, 2007) (to be codified at 42 CFR pts. 411, 412, 413, and
489).
' See id. at 47,204.
154 id
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terizing only when necessary, emphasizing hand washing, and insert-
ing catheter using aseptic technique and sterile equipment.'
CMS reiterated these prevention guidelines in the 2008 Proposed
Rule, stating "[t]he primary prevention intervention would be not
using catheters or removing catheters as soon as possible . . . .
However, as previously indicated, one of the major risk factors in the
development of UTI is the presence of a catheter, which may be ne-
cessary to properly care for patients.'17 Despite this, CMS does not
make any exception for patients requiring long-term catheter care, for
which long-term catheter use is critical to the management of urinary
elimination. 58
For example, consider the Intensive Care Unit, where patients are
often immobile and unable to use the restroom. As stated above, in
some contexts, the risk of a UTI is unavoidable, even with the use of
proper sanitation, if the catheter is used at all.'59 Accordingly, the
only way that the hospital could ensure that the patient in the example
would not contract a catheter-associated UTI is to not use the device.
The hospital thus has two choices: it can leave the patient alone, in
increasing pain and discomfort; or administer proper care that neces-
sarily carries with it a risk of infection. Thus, as a result of the Never
Events Policy, some hospitals would provide proper treatment (by
providing a catheter to a patient in need) and not be reimbursed.'60
Accordingly, one can see a markedly different standard in CMS's
adoption of UTI as a "Never Event." A UTI is not avoidable; it is the
result of a medical risk; and CMS does not adequately present guide-
lines to demonstrate how medical professionals could avert UTIs. In
other words, whereas NQF chose conditions that were avoidable, the
result of hospital mistakes, and avertable through the adoption of sim-
ple guidelines; CMS chose a condition that is common, unavoidable
and the often, contracted despite proper hospital care.
1ss WONG, supra note 152.
156 Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment
Systems, 72 Fed. Reg. at 47,203.
1 APIC, supra note 146, at 8; see also Fred Bazzoli, Cigna the Latest to Say
It Won't Pay For Preventable Medical Errors, HEALTHCARE FIN. NEWS, Apr. 21,
2008, http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/story.cms?id=7935.
15 See Wald & Kramer, supra note 142.
15 Medicare Program; Proposed Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospec-
tive Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2008 Rates, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,719.
160 See Wald & Kramer, supra note 142.
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2. Falls
One can further observe the insufficiency of CMS's standard for
selecting Never Events by analyzing its adoption of trauma caused by
falls from wheelchairs, chairs, beds, other furniture and commodes as
an HAC.16'
First, the event is not entirely avoidable. As in the case of cathe-
ter-associated UTIs, certain patients are much more susceptible to
falls - the elderly perhaps most prominently.162 The incidence of falls
and the severity of complications arising from a fall increase with
age, increased disability, and functional impairment.1 63 For instance,
nearly one-third of people sixty-five years of age or older fall at least
once per year,'1" at number that rises to fifty percent once people turn
eighty years or older.' Among the elderly, falls were the second
leading cause of death due to unintentional injuries in 1994.166
Thus, it may not seem surprising that CMS was more hesitant to
include falls as an HAC.167 In its 2008 Proposed Rule, CMS plainly
stated that falls may not be preventable and, as a result, did not initial-
ly propose adopting "trauma caused from falls" as an HAC.168 But
it still invited comments on the exclusion of falls as a HAC.169
Notwithstanding its initial proposal, in its 2008 Final Rule, CMS
adopted falls as an HAC. 170 CMS did not provide any compelling
reason for its decision, stating generically that falls could be reduced
through the application of evidence-based guidelines.171 CMS simply
stated that falls should be reasonably avoidable by hospitals and pre-
sented no further support for the idea.172
161 Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment
Systems, 72 Fed. Reg. 47,130, 47,214 (Aug. 22, 2007) (to be codified at 42 CFR pts.
411, 412, 413, and 489).
162 Letter from John Murphy, President, Am. Geriatrics Soc'y, to Kerry
Weems, Acting Adm'r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Aug. 25, 2008),
http://www.americangeriatrics.org/products/positionpapers/HAC_1etter2008.pdf.
163 Pekka Kannus et al., Fall-Induced Injuries and Deaths Among Older
Adults, 281 JAMA 1895, 1895 (1999).
' Id.
165 Letter from Murphy, supra note 162, at 3.
166 Kannus et al., supra note 163.
167 See Medicare Program; Proposed Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Pros-
pective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2008 Rates, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,718.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 24,724-24,725.
170 Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment
Systems, 72 Fed. Reg. 47,130, 47,214 (Aug. 22, 2007) (to be codified at 42 CFR pts.
411, 412, 413, and 489).
17' Id.
172 Id. at 47,214-47,215.
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Second, falls are not the result of mistakes that the hospital work-
ers make. While the number of falls can be reduced through the adop-
tion of fall prevention, it is not a medical mistake that should "Never
Happen." 73 A 2008 article in the New England Journal of Medicine
study compared two hospital staffs: one that adopted risk assessments
and strategies for the prevention of falls and one that did not.17 4 In the
study, the staff that applied the fall-risk prevention strategies reduced
the total number of falls by only eleven percent.'75 Put conversely,
eighty-nine percent of the falls happened in spite of fall-reduction
strategies. 176 In response to the New England Journal of Medicine
study,17 7 the President of the American Geriatrics Society predicted
that no evidence-based intervention could reasonably prevent all falls
in elderly patients. 178
A 1999 article from the Journal of the American Medical Associa-
tion seems to confirm these findings, arguing that nationwide fall
injuries would not have been reduced through a change of any hospi-
talization policy, short of favoring outpatient care.' 79 In other words,
even through the best care available, it may be impossible to com-
pletely prevent the elderly from suffering from falls in a hospital
setting.
Third, CMS did not provide guidelines that would enable a hos-
pital to avoid the event. Instead, CMS referred to a website that lists
all the Patient Safety Indicators'8 0 as evidence-based guidelines that
would help a hospital prevent falls,'' which does not mention fall
reduction.' 8 2 These indicators directly contradict the CMS-given de-
finition that evidence-based guidelines are "best practices for perform-
ing certain medical procedures or treatments."' 8 3  Accordingly, any
hospital would likely find it difficult to reduce the occurrence of falls
through the adoption of these contradictory guidelines.
'7 Mary E. Tinetti et al., Effect of Dissemination of Evidence in Reducing
Injuries From Falls, 359 NEw ENG. J. MED. 252 (2008).
174 Id. at 252.
'7 Id. at 258.
176 Id
177 See Tinetti et al, supra note 173.
178 Letter from Murphy, supra note 162, at 3.
179 Kannus et al., supra note 163, at 1898.
180 "Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) are a set of measures that screen for ad-
verse events that patients experience as a result of exposure to the health care sys-
tem." Agency for Health Care Research & Quality, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., Patient Safety Indicators Fact Sheet (2006), http://qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/
downloads/psi/2006-Feb-PatientSafetylndicators.pdf.
181 Id.
182 id.
183 Fisk, supra note 8.
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Thus, one can see that CMS applied a low standard in its adoption
of "trauma caused by falls" as a Never Event. Like catheter-
associated UTI, CMS chooses an HAC that is unavoidable among
certain patients; is not a medical mistake; and CMS does so without
providing realistic guidelines on how to prevent or mitigate injuries
caused from falls. Again, this standard is in stark contrast to the stan-
dard used to create the NQF list - events that are preventable; that
result from medical mistakes; and that are avoidable through the adop-
tion of simple guidelines.184
3. Further Questions
Further, this Never Events policy raises other complicating issues
that CMS never addresses."s Though it is intended to reduce costs,
this policy could have the opposite effect - and actually increase the
cost of care as hospitals spend additional costs on screening and on an
undefined appeals process.1 86 Other commentators suggest that this
policy will force hospitals to engage in cost shifting and thus, will not
reduce costs at all.'8 7 Instead of facing a financial punishment, hos-
pitals will simply allocate unpaid costs of care from one patient
through above-cost charges to other patient populations. 88
Additionally, hospitals will be forced to increase its resources
towards screening. As previous indicated, CMS's policy is based
upon the IPPS reimbursement billing system. 8 9 If the present-on-
admission code is not present, CMS presumes that the condition was
hospital-acquired and will not reimburse the hospital.190 As a result, a
hospital must ensure that it detects all preexisting conditions."' As
previously indicated, a hospital must screen an entering patient
through the use of a doctor or a trained technician in order to receive
reimbursement for treating a Never Event.192
However, hospitals may be violating the law if they attempt to
screen in an emergency. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Ac-
184 See supra Part III.A.
185 See generally Fisk, supra note 8.
186 Id.
187 Dobson et al., define cost shifting as "systematically higher prices (above
cost) paid by one payer group to offset lower prices (below cost) paid by another."
Allen Dobson et al., The Cost-Shift Payment 'Hydraulic': Foundation, History, and
Implications, 25 HEALTH AFF. 22, 23 (2006).
188 See id.
189 See supra Section 1.
190 See supra Section I.
191 See supra Section I.
192 See supra Section 1; see also James Schlett, Medicare Won't Pay For
Hospital-Acquired Injuries, DAILY GAZETTE, Sept. 28, 2008, at Cl.
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tive Labor Act (EMTALA) forbids a hospital from delaying medical
examination and treatment in the emergency department in order to
obtain insurance information' 93 or prior authorization for care.' 94 This
may present a unique challenge with regard to Never Events, where
the screening is necessary to receive reimbursement - and thus an
attempt to receive authorization for care.' 95 As a result, a hospital
may not be able to thoroughly detect for the presence of some Never
Events for patients that it admits for care.196
Consider an example where a man enters the emergency room
complaining of chest pains. The physician quickly determines that the
man is suffering from a heart attack and in need of emergency care.
The man also exhibits many of the individual characteristics that make
him more likely to be suffering from an early-stage pressure ulcer - a
Never Event that is particularly hard to detect in early stages.197 The
1 The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA")
42 USCA 1395; see also PETER R. KONGSTVEDT, MANAGED CARE: WHAT IS IT AND
How IT WORKS 83 (3d ed. 2008); see also Diana K. Quinn et al., The Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of 1985 and the Practice of Psychiatry, 53
PSYCHIATRY SERVICES 1301, 1303 (2002) (providing a brief summary of the Emer-
gency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of 1985).
194 Gov. Accountability Office, Emergency Care: EMTALA Implementation
and Enforcement Issues GAO-01-747 at 13 (June 22, 2001) (explaining that "the
1999 Special Advisory Bulletin [clarifying EMTALA issues] hospitals should not
obtain prior authorization from an individual's insurance company before screening
or stabilizing treatment begins.").
19 For a description of the IPPS billing system, and the use of Present-On-
Admission codes, see supra note 77 and accompanying text.
196 Quinn et al., supra note 193, at 1301 (stating that "the intent of this legis-
lation is not to punish physicians or hospitals but to protect patients and health care
providers from economic, institutional and political pressures that might compromise
health care providers' ability to evaluate and treat patients who are seeking emergen-
cy care").
19 A pressure ulcer forms when an area of skin remains in one position for an
extended period of time, due to the patient's inability to shift their body. Univ. of
Md. Med. Ctr., Pressure Ulcer - Overview (2008), http://www.umm.edulency/article/
007071.htm. There are five factors that make a person more susceptible to a pressure
ulcer: immobility, inactivity, nutritional factors, fecal and urinary incontinence, and
decreased sensory perception. Wound Care Info. Network, Staging Pressure Ulcers
(2008), http://www.medicaledu.com/staging.htm. Hence, pressure ulcers often exist
among obese patients, who are immobile, inactive, and have poor nutritional factors.
Pressure ulcers exist in four separate stages, with symptoms ranging from "changes in
... skin temperature" (phase one) to "full thickness skin loss with extensive destruc-
tion" (phase four). Wound Care Info. Network, supra. Thus, a patient with a phase I
pressure ulcer could enter a hospital with an unidentified pressure ulcer and have no
visible symptoms. CMS responds to this by stating, "by selecting this condition, we
would provide hospitals the incentive to perform careful examination of the skin of
patients on admission to identify [pressure] ulcers." Final Rule Regarding Changes to
the Medicare Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems, 72 Fed. Reg. 47,203
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physician is between a rock and a hard place. On one hand, she
knows that if she does not thoroughly screen the man for a pressure
ulcer, the hospital will not have the proper present-on-admission
codes that it needs to receive reimbursement.' 98 On the other hand,
the patient is in need of emergency care for his heart, and further, the
physician cannot delay treatment or else risk a violation of EMTALA
for delaying treatment in order to obtain a form of "prior authorization
for care."'1
99
The hospital's only line of defense would be to appeal. However,
it is not clear that a hospital would even have the right to appeal a
Never Event ruling, or how it would do so. CMS declined to specify
any appeals process, only stating that current procedures allow pro-
viders to challenge denials of reimbursement. 200  Accordingly, any
hospitals that decide to appeal a denial in reimbursement may find
themselves in a lengthy, undefined appeals process - a cost that could
ultimately be passed on to its patients.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
This Section makes three recommendations. First, it suggests that
CMS should revise the standard it uses when selecting future Never
Events. Primarily, it should adopt a standard that is similar to the one
used by the NQF. Second, this Section suggests that CMS should
revise its current list of Never Events to those events that the NQF
vetted. Doing so would reduce the number of HACs from ten to three
and ensure that hospitals would have proper guidelines to avoid a
Never Event. Third, CMS needs to change how it selects future Never
Events.
First, CMS should revise the standard it uses when it selects fu-
ture Never Events. As previously indicated, CMS's standard has in-
herent problems. 2 0' Accordingly, a hospital may find itself being de-
nied reimbursement for a patient's unavoidable injuries caused by a
(Aug. 22, 2007).
198 EMTALA, supra note 193; see also KONGSTVEDT, supra note 200. This is
because the hospital will not have the proper present-on-admission coding. For a
brief description of IPPS coding, and Present-on-Admission coding, see Linda
Wilson, POA Coding Challenges: Concern Grows over Quality of Documentation,
MODERN HEALTHCARE, June 2, 2008, at 10.
199 "A violation of EMTALA can result in fines of up to $50,000 per violation
... and loss of Medicare reimbursement." Quinn et al., supra note 193, at 1301.
200 See Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective
Payment Systems, 72 Fed. Reg. 47,130, 47,216 (Aug. 22, 2007) (to be codified at 42
CFR pts. 411, 412, 413, and 489).
201 See supra Section I.
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non-preventable condition and without guidance from CMS on how
the hospital could improve in the care.
Instead, CMS should reevaluate how it selects future events to be
included in the list. CMS should account for three factors: (1) the
ability of the hospital to completely avoid the event; (2) the existence
of true industry-wide evidence-based guidelines; and (3) the effect
that event has upon the patient's life. For example, had CMS used
this standard in selecting its original list, it would have selected "for-
eign object retained in the body following surgery" as a Never Event
and not a "Catheter-Associated U.T.I." By adopting this standard,
CMS would only choose events that were both truly avoidable and
largely disabling to patients.
Second, CMS should limit its current list of Never Events to com-
pletely preventable medical errors that have been vetted through a
NQF-like collaboration process. 20 2 In doing so, CMS should distin-
guish between those events that are truly preventable (or medical mis-
takes) and those that are complications of illness or hospital stays (or
medical risks).203 Coincidentally, of the ten categories of HACs, the
only events that are always preventable are all found on the NQF's list
of Never Events. Practically speaking, this change would mean re-
ducing the number of Never Events to three: leaving foreign objects in
the body during surgery; failing to prevent air embolisms following
surgery; and providing incompatible blood or blood products during
care.204
CMS could better serve hospitals by adopting guidelines that ac-
curately reflect the practices used in the medical profession. 205  If
CMS chooses to do this, it needs to carefully select guidelines that
will enable hospitals, physicians, and medical care workers to com-
pletely avoid the Never Events. To facilitate this, CMS should follow
the example set by the NQF, and seek a consensus from physicians,
hospitals, and other healthcare providers, including "public and pri-
vate purchasers; national, regional, state, and local groups
representing consumers; accrediting bodies; supporting industries; and
organizations involved in healthcare research or quality improve-
ment." 206
202 Press Release, Nat'l Quality Forum, supra note 90.
203 For a workable definition of medical errors, see Wu et al., supra note 6.
204 This list intentionally excludes wrong-site surgery - a NQF condition that
CMS proposed but ultimately could not fit into its payment codes.
205 Alternatively, CMS could abandon the requirement altogether. For a dis-
cussion on the problems with evidence-based guidelines, see supra, note 138.
206 NAT'L QUALITY FORUM SRE, supra note 45. As discussed above, some
consider NQF's process to be the "gold standard" of health care measurement. See
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Never Events policies represent an effort to reduce
costs and medical errors, but ultimately raise many unanswered ques-
tions, as this Note has attempted to demonstrate.207 Although many
groups have used the term "Never Events," the standard by which the
events are selected has changed considerably over time. Whereas
policy groups once used the term to mark the distinction between ac-
ceptable and unacceptable levels of hospital care, it has evolved into a
government policy that punishes the occurrence of unavoidable
events. In other words, while Never Events once referred to "events
that should never happen," it now refers to events that are unavoidable
hospital risks without guidance on how to improve in the future. Put
simply, Never Events are now events that sometimes happen and can-
not be avoided.
Further, a number of questions remain unanswered. For example,
what ability does the hospital have to appeal a Never Event determi-
nation? How should a patient's unique characteristics affect a Never
Events determination? (For example, the patient's age, mobility, etc.).
How should a hospital improve its care in the future, so as to avoid a
similar determination in the absence of appropriate evidence-based
guidelines? Finally, how will EMTALA interact with physician's
requirement to screen all patients on admission for a Never Event?
Ultimately, hospitals and patients will have to determine the an-
swers to these questions. They will likely do so by paving the way
through a costly appeals process and incurring a difficult financial
burden that may ultimately increase, instead of reduce, costs. Accor-
dingly, CMS should rethink this policy, and change the standard it
uses in selecting Never Events. Until CMS does so, hospitals will
likely find Never Events policies confusing, vague, difficult to im-
plement, and ultimately, unhelpful to patient care.
Press Release, Nat'l Quality Forum, supra note 50.
207 See supra Section I.
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